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Abstract
Uncertainty is endemic to innovative economies and complex societies, but policymakers 
underestimate how damaging this is for many of their guiding assumptions. In particular, 
the discourse of best practice, “global solutions for global problems,” and regulatory har-
monization becomes questionable when there is substantial uncertainty about the future. 
This uncertainty makes it impossible to know what best practice will be and increases the 
danger that harmonization will result in highly correlated errors and shared analytical blind 
spots. The transnational harmonization of regulation has well-known advantages, but – es-
pecially in technocratic policy areas – also creates vulnerability to unexpected challenges 
by constraining how we think as well as homogenizing how we act. Faced with uncertainty, 
policymakers should be wary of monocultures in regulation, analysis, and practice, and in-
stead focus on managing policy diversity to limit its costs. This paper’s theoretical argument 
is grounded in philosophy, the history of ideas, and even biology. However, we also present 
empirical examples and consider some implications for political theory.
Zusammenfassung
In von Innovation geprägten Ökonomien und komplexen Gesellschaften ist Unsicherheit 
allgegenwärtig. Politische Akteure unterschätzen systematisch, wie sehr sie ihre Leitgedan-
ken untergräbt. Fundamentale Unsicherheit über die Zukunft stellt insbesondere den Best-
Practice-Gedanken, „globale Lösungen für globale Probleme“ sowie das Leitbild regulato-
rischer Harmonisierung infrage. Unsicherheit macht es unmöglich, vorauszusagen, was in 
der Zukunft Best Practice sein wird, und erhöht die Gefahr, dass sich aus Harmonisierungs-
bemühungen hoch korrelierte Fehler und weitverbreitete analytische blinde Flecken erge-
ben. Harmonisierung von Regulierung auf transnationaler Ebene hat bekannte Vorteile, 
jedoch schafft sie – insbesondere in technokratischen Politikbereichen –  Verletzbarkeit bei 
unerwarteten Anforderungen, weil sie dazu führt, dass wir eingeschränkter denken und 
ähnlicher handeln. Politische Akteure sollten Monokulturen in Regulierung, Analyse und 
Praxis mit Vorsicht gegenübertreten und die Kosten politischer Diversität regelnd eindäm-
men. Die theoretische Argumentation dieses Discussion Papers  basiert auf Gedanken aus 
der Philosophie, der Ideengeschichte und selbst der Biologie. Es werden jedoch auch empi-
rische Beispiele erläutert und Implikationen für die politische Theorie diskutiert.
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Uncertainty and the Dangers of Monocultures in 
Regulation, Analysis, and Practice
1 Introduction and policy context
It is commonplace to assert that global problems need global solutions. The usual im-
plication is that regulatory solutions should be global in nature, so as to avoid unilateral 
local actions that may be self-defeating at system level.1 The extended post-2007 eco-
nomic, financial, and social crisis has, for example, led to renewed efforts to agree a better 
framework of harmonized regulations in finance at the global level (Basel III), in trade 
at the interregional level (TTIP, TPP), and in the euro area through the banking, capital 
markets, and fiscal unions. Further, in policy and business circles, the need for rational 
players to converge on “best practice” often seems to be the grand narrative of our age.2
By contrast, in this paper, we argue that – given the prevalence of radical uncertainty 
in many areas – the discourse of best practice often rests on a false assumption that it 
is possible to know ex ante what best practice will be. We also argue that global (or re-
gional) convergence on a regulatory and analytical “monoculture” – where all those op-
erating in a policy or business area come to have their behavior and analysis structured 
by the same norms and conceptual grids – is dangerous in conditions of uncertainty; for 
the resulting high correlations in any unforeseen errors and analytical blind spots may, 
We would like to acknowledge the many helpful suggestions received from participants in research 
seminars at the European Institute, LSE (October 2013), the Council for European Studies confer-
ence (March 2014), the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (February 2016) and the 
MaxPo/Institut d’études avancées de Paris conference (March 2016), where earlier versions of this 
argument were presented. For their detailed comments, we are especially grateful to Nicholas Barr, 
Jens Beckert, Suzanne Berger, Mark Blyth, Timur Ergen, Peter A. Hall, Bob Hancké, Eva Heims, Abby 
Innes, Richard Locke, Mareike Kleine, Annabelle Lever, Damian Raess, Aidan Regan, Dennis J. Snow-
er, and Waltraud Schelkle. Stubborn shortcomings remain entirely our own responsibility.
1 See, for example, WTO Public Forum 2009: Global Problems, Global Solutions; and ex-UK Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown’s, “Let’s Stick Together,” New York Times, November 30, 2011 (www.
nytimes.com/2012/11/30/opinion/global/gordon-brown-global-economic-problems-need-
global-solutions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&).
2 At the multilateral level, see, for example, the OECD Best Practice Principles on the Governance 
of Regulators (www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/governance-regulators.htm); or, at the na-
tional level, see the Australian Office of Best Practice Regulation (www.dpmc.gov.au/regulation/
best-practice-regulation).
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in turn, cause systemic instability. Finally, we suggest that Mill ([1859]1991: 71) was 
right to privilege the liberty to conduct diverse “experiments in living” as the bedrock of 
social learning and progress. 
It is, of course, important to learn from the past; but the discovery of new and viable 
ways of navigating the unknown future is more likely when societies embrace the “gen-
erative friction” (Stark 2009: 16f.) implied by keeping a number of different approaches 
to regulation in play. This can be achieved by belonging to multinational institutional 
structures like the EU that combine the mutual recognition of different national regula-
tions with joint institutions allowing for “deliberative polyarchy” (Sabel/Zeitlin 2010);3 
or by having federal structures within a single nation, such as the USA, that permit con-
structive friction between diverse practices (Eagan 2015; Dorf/Sabel 1998).
In highlighting the dangers of “global solutions to global problems” in the “thick” sense 
of homogenous worldwide standards of best practice (or convergence on a single set of 
regulatory and analytical models in any particular policy area), we are not committed 
to the absurd view that there is no need for global (or regional) coordination of national 
policies. Rather, our point is that modern policy discourse too often confuses the para-
mount need for coordination with a need for homogeneity of practice or synchronicity of 
performance.4 Coordination is undoubtedly necessary to reduce the negative spillovers 
and costs of policy diversity and to limit free riding by some countries on the efforts 
of others. However, we call for a nuanced approach of managing policy diversity across 
nations to ensure such coordination, rather than effacing the very diversity that (in 
conditions of uncertainty) is essential for system-level resilience and the avoidance of 
highly correlated errors. 
It is important to qualify our enthusiasm for policy diversity. First, our provocative 
intervention is explicitly targeted against multinational harmonization of regulations 
(and analytical models) in the technocratic areas of trade, finance, and economic or 
environmental management and not, for example, against legal convergence in the area 
of basic human rights. Second, our intervention is designed to shift perceptions of the 
balance of advantage between harmonization and diversity of regulation rather than 
to argue for a wholesale rejection of regulatory convergence. We recognize that some 
degree of harmonization is a sine qua non for social stability and economic order – par-
ticularly within nation states. Even at the multinational level, we do not claim that har-
monization is always a mistake. Instead, we argue that, when making judgments about 
3 Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) show that many aspects of EU governance, including colleges of regula-
tors and the Open Method of Coordination, lend themselves to deliberative learning from the 
diverse practices and analytical traditions of member states. 
4 So, for example, we would argue that a fatal error in the construction of the euro area was to as-
sume that a focus (in the Maastricht criteria and elsewhere) on convergence (or synchronicity) 
of inflation rates, budget deficits, and long-term interest rates was a substitute for the coordina-
tion of economic policy. Indeed, given system externalities, it may be beneficial for the area as a 
whole to have economies on different trajectories.
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the relative merits of harmonization and diversity of regulatory regimes, policymakers 
should take account of the serious epistemic and system-stability costs we identify as 
implied by excessive harmonization of analysis and practice. We also argue that the bal-
ance is most likely to favor policy diversity in conditions of uncertainty and when poli-
cymakers have access to (or can create) the institutional capacity to manage effectively 
the costs of such diversity.
Central to this paper is the premise that in technocratic areas of policy, key players are 
constrained in how they think by the specialist conceptual grids or mental priors as-
sociated with their everyday practices and regulatory environment. While in Section 4 
we derive this premise from the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Kuhn, Tett (2015: 44f.) 
derives a similar assumption from the social anthropology of Bourdieu, with its focus 
on the mutual reinforcement of habitual practices or social environment, on the one 
hand, and the semi-conscious cultural norms or mental maps that structure thought, 
on the other. Tett (2015, passim) uses this premise to underline the dangers inherent in 
the fragmentation of policymaking and corporate institutions into rigid cultural “silos” 
associated with disciplinary or functional specialization. Tett further calls for “joined-
up” thinking and the imaginative “flipping” of perspectives to overcome the perils of 
“tunnel vision.”
The focus of the present paper is quite different. We believe that the biggest danger 
at system level arises when desire for universal best practice or the removal of trade 
barriers leads to the adoption (in any particular specialist area) of globally or region-
ally homogenous regulations, modeling frameworks, and routine practices. Such global 
or regional monocultures actually compound the problematic tunnel vision caused by 
operating in a single cultural silo. Indeed, we argue that worldwide homogenization of 
regulatory, management, or policy analysis and practice within any technocratic area 
(such as risk management or central bank forecasting) represents as big a danger as the 
fragmentation of analysis and practice into these technocratic silos in the first place. In 
other words, it is as crucial to allow for pluralism within each analytical or functional 
silo as it is to encourage those in the various silos to understand the importance of see-
ing the world from the perspective of another silo entirely. Such pluralism, we argue, is 
best guaranteed by the mutual recognition at international (or federal) level of different 
forms of regulation or institutional structure and different modes of practice and analy-
sis. This is particularly the case when there are also multilateral institutions promoting 
learning from the diversity safeguarded in this way. 
The foundations of the argument outlined in the present paper are theoretical rather 
than empirical and rooted in concepts from philosophy, biology, portfolio theory, and 
the history of ideas. However, before we consider the nature and implications of uncer-
tainty and the systemic case for regulatory and cognitive diversity, it is useful to refer to 
two practical examples from the academic literature – one relating to trade and financial 
regulation and the other to climate change – that help establish the salience of our argu-
ment across a broad swathe of socio-economic, financial, and environmental policies. 
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First, Rodrik argues that the GATT trade regime may have been so successful in pro-
moting growth and stability after World War II precisely because it combined multilat-
eralism with mechanisms (such as derogations and safeguards) that allowed for a high 
degree of local policy discretion. He then compares this Bretton Woods approach with 
the headlong rush in the last twenty years toward global financial standards (and har-
monized trading regulations) that has coincided with greater economic and financial 
instability. Rodrik’s point is not merely that these new regimes ride roughshod over 
important national differences in structure or preference. His more profound point 
is that by striving for a global regulatory regime, policymakers are always in danger of 
“converging on the wrong set of regulations” (Rodrik 2009). The recent financial crisis 
has shown just how wrong previously accepted regulatory best practice can turn out to 
be, and Rodrik (2011: 224) draws what is for us the key conclusion: “In the light of the 
great uncertainty about the merits of different regulatory approaches, it may be better 
to let a variety of regulatory models flourish side by side.” 
Secondly, Ostrom (2009) challenged the widespread view that it is necessary to tackle 
the quintessentially global problem of climate change with a single worldwide policy ap-
proach. She argued that such a gargantuan problem is more likely to be solved through 
experimentation and the trial and error learning that arises from different countries 
trying out diverse policies. As Ostrom (2009: 39) put it, “Given the complexity and 
changing nature of the problems involved in coping with climate change, there are no 
‘optimal’ solutions;” and the advantage of a “polycentric approach” is that it “encour-
ages experimental efforts at multiple levels.” She even challenged the emphasis placed 
by many of those influenced by Olson’s logic of collective action (Olson 1965) on the 
need for global incentives to prevent some free riding on the efforts of others, when she 
argued that the trust and knowledge required to avoid tragedies of the commons are 
usually much easier to engender at local level.
While these two examples do not provide knockout empirical evidence for our position, 
they nonetheless have disquieting implications for those who believe in global solutions 
and homogenous best practice regulation. Like Rodrik and Ostrom, we do not deny that 
harmonization around a single definition of best practice has advantages – advantages 
that are well rehearsed in the political economy literature (reducing transaction costs, 
avoiding beggar-thy-neighbor policies, removing barriers to trade, etc.).5 Rather, our ar-
gument is that these undoubted benefits need to be balanced against the frequently over-
looked costs of such global harmonization – costs that tend to be particularly high in con-
ditions of uncertainty. As we will demonstrate, these costs include the system instability 
caused when a homogenous regulatory (and associated conceptual or modeling) frame-
work leads to highly correlated analytical failures to spot newly emerging problems and 
a resulting synchronization of perverse behavioral responses. The costs also include a loss 
of policy diversification and a reduced cognitive capacity for adaptation and learning.6
5 Useful reviews of this literature can be found in Levi-Faur (2011) and Dehouse (1997). 
6 This paper’s focus on the epistemic costs of global best practice and on the damage to the 
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2 Uncertainty back on center stage and attendant paradoxes
Uncertainty is the central scope condition for the warnings outlined in this paper about 
the dangers of analytical monocultures, harmonized regulations, and global definitions 
of best practice. Whenever there is a significant and irreducible element of uncertainty 
about the future, it follows as a matter of logic that it is impossible to know ex ante 
what best practice will be. Further, whenever the present is ambiguous or the future un-
foreseeable, diversity of outlook and practice may help protect against the possibility of 
highly correlated (and therefore destabilizing) errors and have significant adaptive value. 
However, before exploring the implications of uncertainty for policy choices, we should 
examine whether the challenge posed by uncertainty (and related knowledge problems) 
is central to socio-economic life or instead – as modern economics largely assumes – an 
occasional feature that can be safely ignored. To help answer this question, it is useful to 
review relevant elements of economic theory and social context, before unpacking phil-
osophical ideas that demonstrate how important the problems posed by uncertainty are 
likely to be for policy practice.
Modern economics emerged as a branch of “social physics” (Mirowski 1989), wedded to 
determinate and equilibrium based models, with agents assumed to be rationally opti-
mizing within known constraints (Bronk 2009: 78f.). Economics is, of course, a sophis-
ticated discipline with plenty of scope for epistemological nuance, and much attention 
has been given in recent years to the concepts of bounded rationality (Conlisk 1996), 
asymmetries of information (Akerlof 1970), and the bias implied by contingent frames 
(Kahneman/Tversky 2000). Nevertheless, while these concepts help address some key 
knowledge problems facing economic agents, they are usually presented as minor ca-
veats to the assumed ability of agents in a competitive market to learn how to optimize 
their preferences; and, rather than placing uncertainty center stage, they represent a se-
ries of “bolt-on” amendments to determinate models designed to safeguard their ability 
to predict behavior (Bronk 2009: 80f.). As a result, any best practice rules informed by 
this body of theory are assumed to take into account the predictable frailties of know-
ing agents, and in many cases they are designed specifically to correct for these frailties.
The uncertainty and knowledge problems that concern us in this paper are altogether 
more pervasive and troubling than those addressed in these branches of behavioral 
and information economics. Instead of “asymmetric information,” our focus is on the 
“symmetric ignorance” (Skidelsky 2009: 45) of the present and future facing all agents 
operating in complex and innovative societies or markets in the absence of systematic 
stability of the world economy caused by regulatory harmonization should be seen as comple-
mentary to other arguments in favor of policy diversity – notably the Varieties of Capitalism 
argument in favor of each nation exploiting its own area of comparative institutional advantage 
(Hall/Soskice 2001) and the democratic argument for respecting diverse electoral preferences, 
cultural norms, and national identities (e.g., Nicolaïdis 2013)
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regularities. In this regard, we are influenced by economists from the generation after 
1918 when radical uncertainty was a central preoccupation of many in the discipline. 
Knight (1921: 232f.), for example, famously distinguished between measurable or trac-
table “risk” (where probabilities can be calculated) and immeasurable or radical “un-
certainty” (where no probabilities can be calculated because each case is unique). He 
was adamant that such uncertainty is central to economic life – indeed, the very basis 
of entrepreneurial profits (Knight 1921: 311), since profits would otherwise be quickly 
competed away in any well-functioning market (Bronk 2016). 
Keynes agreed with Knight on the importance of uncertainty, saying: “The outstanding 
fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our estimates of 
prospective yield have to be made” (Keynes 1936: 149). Such pervasive uncertainty (to-
gether with stock market turmoil) led Keynes to question the wisdom imparted by mar-
ket prices. By contrast, the same concern with uncertainty led his great rival, Hayek, to 
argue for the impossibility of socialist calculation. For Hayek, while markets never tend 
toward any kind of optimal equilibrium, they do at least have the unique ability to reflect 
the decentralized, tacit, and constantly evolving knowledge of all participants – knowl-
edge that “never exists in concentrated or integrated form” (Hayek [1945]1948: 77). The 
ability to harness and reflect the cognitive diversity and dispersed information sources of 
myriad different actors was, Hayek thought, the great merit of markets, and one that can 
never be replicated by governments and their aggregate statistics (Bronk 2013a).
By 1945, the debate in economics appeared finely balanced between those, like Keynes, 
who argued that markets were vitiated by radical uncertainty (and therefore needed 
stabilization by government intervention) and those, like Hayek, who argued that gov-
ernments could never have sufficient knowledge to intervene usefully in markets. Un-
certainty was a key feature of both sides of the argument.
In the 60 years that followed World War II, the focus on uncertainty among academ-
ics and policymakers waned.7 Initially, this reflected the post-war success of Keynes-
ian policies and the apparent stability created by Bretton Woods institutions. When 
both broke down in the 1970s, the resurgence of neoclassical economics promulgated a 
faith in the stabilizing effect of unfettered markets. Crucially, however, this new faith in 
markets was not – as in Hayek’s work – because markets were seen as a way of helping 
to navigate endemic and irreducible uncertainty. Rather, the new faith in markets was 
rooted in models assuming rational expectations, optimizing agents, and efficient mar-
kets. Lucas may have acknowledged that “in cases of uncertainty, economic reasoning 
will be of no value” (Fontana 2010: 590); but his Chicago school simply assumed this 
problem away. Uncertainty became defined as (Knightian) risk, with any error value in 
probability forecasts assumed to be essentially random.
7 See, for example, Hodgson (2011: 161), on how the concept of uncertainty was largely missing 
from mainstream economics journals after the 1980s.
Bronk/Jacoby: Uncertainty and the Dangers of Monocultures in Regulation, Analysis, and Practice 7
Rational-expectations-theory and efficient-market-hypothesis based models came to 
dominate large areas of monetary policy and finance theory; and these models only 
make sense if we assume that there is (in any particular situation) a correct model of the 
future (usually based on systematic regularities in the past) on which actors will con-
verge in competitive markets (Frydman/Goldberg 2001: 64f.). At the same time, finan-
cial markets and their regulators fell under the spell of what Power has called a “world-
level grand narrative of risk management” (Power 2007: viii). This narrative included 
the framing assumption that the probability of future losses is calculable on the basis 
of past data, and that users of risk models can therefore achieve higher returns for any 
given level of risk (Haldane 2009a). In fact, as we have learned since the post-2007 crash, 
Value at Risk (VaR) and other such models fatally confused measurable risk with the 
sort of radical uncertainty necessarily implied by widespread innovation (Bronk 2011). 
The expectations of most market actors in the run-up to the crisis (as schooled by the ex 
ante risk-modeling monoculture) are revealed to have been delusional, and the events 
that followed were almost literally unimaginable before the crisis. 
Radical uncertainty is back with a vengeance. Yet, despite this, there has to date been 
relatively little change in basic risk management and economic modeling assumptions 
and policy practice. Indeed, Schmidt and Thatcher (2013) have documented the sur-
prising resilience of neo-liberal economic ideas in general as the main driver of trends 
in market regulation and economic policy, even in the face of the evident failure of 
these ideas to forestall (or cope effectively with) the huge uncertainties revealed (and 
unleashed) by the post-2007 crisis. 
To this conundrum of unwarranted intellectual continuity in the face of disaster, we add 
the related paradox that policymakers still pay lip service to the idea of global best prac-
tice and still attempt (whether in Basel III, TPP/TTIP or the euro area reforms) to speed 
up the adoption of harmonized rules and homogenous practices, despite all the recent 
evidence of uncertainties faced in designing rules to address rapidly evolving policy 
challenges, and despite the highly correlated failures associated with pre-crisis efforts 
to converge on a uniform set of best practice regulatory models.8 The constant threat 
of further financial panic continues to result in more hastily conceived global rules and 
homogenized standards rather than deepening recognition of how much harm such 
homogeneity can cause.
In this paper, we suggest that four closely related intellectual tendencies can help explain 
this conundrum and paradox. Our explanations complement, rather than replace, those 
given by Schmidt and Thatcher for the resilience of neo-liberal ideas (theory mending, 
vested interests, power asymmetries, and the rhetorical power of ideas promoted by 
8 See discussion in Haldane (2009b: 18f.) on the massive rise in correlations of market returns in 
2004–7 caused by both “financial imitation” and the “prescriptive rulebook of Basel II” designed 
to ensure a “level playing field.” Haldane writes: “The level playing field resulted in everyone 
playing the same game at the same time, often with the same ball.” 
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elite epistemic communities), as well as those given by political economists more gener-
ally to explain the push to harmonize rules and regulations (reducing transaction costs, 
solving coordination problems, and preventing free riding). Our hypothesis is that at-
tempts to harmonize policy and practice (according to predominantly neo-liberal defi-
nitions of best practice) remain prevalent partly because of four widespread intellectual 
failures: 
1. Underestimating uncertainty: a continued misunderstanding about the nature and 
prevalence of uncertainty, and refusal to acknowledge the implications of this uncer-
tainty for the possibility of optimizing policy according to best practice; 
2. Forgetting framing effects: a failure to understand the inevitable framing effect of 
theories and conceptual frameworks embedded in regulatory practice, or to appre-
ciate the shared analytical blind spots therefore caused by any deeply entrenched 
regulatory monoculture; 
3. Ignoring correlation dangers: a failure (despite the analogous lessons of biology and 
portfolio theory) to appreciate that high correlations in analysis and practice – as 
well as the interdependence generated by homogenous regulations and models – can 
themselves cause systemic instability; 
4. Undervaluing diversity’s contribution: insufficient attention paid to the positive role 
of regulatory diversity – and of diverse experiments in living more generally – in al-
lowing for successful adaptation to new developments. 
By unpacking and seeking to counter these intellectual failures in remaining sections 
of this article, we help explain why policymakers have clung to an outmoded faith in 
efficient markets, and we underline the dangers of monocultures in regulation, analy-
sis, and practice and the value of diversity of thought and behavior. We also provide a 
basis for theorizing about the kind of multilateral institutions required to cope with 
uncertainty – those that sustain rather than suppress diversity of regulation and prac-
tice; those that harness the benefits of diverse experiments in living; and those that can, 
nevertheless, help avoid some of the costs of diversity of regulation that have made such 
diversity unfashionable in recent years. 
3 Understanding the ubiquity and implications of radical uncertainty
The first intellectual failure we examine is the tendency to underestimate uncertainty. 
The uncertainty facing economic actors is normally reduced to a series of more or less 
tractable epistemological problems resulting from contingent or necessary shortcom-
ings of human beings as knowing agents or of the market or social institutions in which 
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they are embedded. These shortcomings may include the inability of agents to compute 
quickly all the relevant factors or information in complex settings – bounded rationality; 
pockets of debilitating ignorance caused by institutional or market structures that priv-
ilege certain actors over others in terms of access to information – information asym-
metries; or a failure on the part of agents to assess evidence in a fully rational manner 
owing to certain biases of affect or linguistic framing – framing biases. 
These knowledge problems are important. But we can only fully appreciate the perva-
sive and irreducible nature of uncertainty if we also consider the ontological aspects of 
uncertainty – the degree to which the underlying reality that agents are attempting to 
understand is itself ambiguous or even radically indeterminate. As Dequech (2001: 915, 
920) argues, uncertainty has “both an ontological and an epistemological dimension,” 
and there is a close connection between the ontological features of reality (such as its 
complexity) and the epistemological attributes of socio-economic agents (such as their 
bounded rationality). Nevertheless, it is helpful analytically to differentiate between the 
ontological and epistemological aspects of uncertainty, since this helps us to under-
stand better the causal interactions between them. 
So, for example, the ontology of a modern economy identified by complexity econo-
mists – that is, prone to increasing returns and threshold effects – makes it epistemolog-
ically inevitable that economic agents will often be unable to make precise predictions. 
This is because tiny differences in initial conditions (or in the interpretation of those 
conditions by different actors) may snowball into radically divergent outcomes (Arthur 
2015). Similarly, the fact that social reality is irremediably multifaceted (comprising, 
among other aspects, physical constraints, the normative and political interpretations 
of social actors, institutions, power dynamics, and monetary weightings) creates con-
siderable barriers to knowledge. Moreover, physical reality is, prior to contingent inter-
pretations of it, “brute and nameless” (Murdoch [1953]1999: 42) and does not come 
pre-packaged in unambiguous categories (Blyth 2011: 83–86). Together, this implies 
that social actors never have unambiguous and unmediated access to reality. Instead, 
all actors are reliant on the limited and often incommensurable conceptual frames that 
their minds (and social contexts) supply. No single model or conceptual framework can 
give an all-encompassing perspective on multifaceted reality.
Behind the economist’s notion of optimization – or the regulator’s notion of best prac-
tice – lies a comforting (but frequently inappropriate) ontology: the world is assumed to 
be stable (and knowable) in the sense that the future is a systematic function of param-
eters and probabilistic regularities already “out there” (which can in principle be known 
and calculated). As Davidson (1996: 479–486) puts it, “future outcomes are merely the 
statistical shadow of past and current market signals;” and while agents may not always 
have a good handle on these probabilities, they assume them to exist ex ante as part of 
an “immutable” or “ergodic” reality. The reassuring implication of this ontology is that 
competitive forces will ensure that expectations converge on this objective reality (in-
cluding the predetermined future) as systematic errors in forecasting are eliminated in 
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the race to succeed (Bronk 2016). If the world were genuinely like this, it would indeed 
be plausible that agents could learn what is, and will be, best practice. 
Central to our doubts about the wisdom of convergence on homogenous rules based on 
established best practice is the prevalence, by contrast, of “non-ergodic” and “transmut-
able” elements of social reality that are not pre-determined by antecedent conditions – 
where the future is genuinely unknowable until critical choices and creative inventions 
have been made (Davidson 1996: 479–486). The reason agents cannot learn what best 
practice will be is that so much of the future is ontologically indeterminate. 
To understand why, we need to turn to Shackle, who first noted the central link be-
tween uncertainty and the innovation or novelty that is central to all dynamic capitalist 
economies. Shackle (1979: 52f.) wrote of “our own original, ungoverned novelties of 
imagination … injecting, in some respect ex nihilo, the unforeknowable arrangement 
of elements.” In other words, innovative ideas and the novel choices made by entrepre-
neurs (and others) introduce breaks in previously stable regularities of behavior, and 
hence constitute a barrier to their ability to forecast the future. For Shackle ([1972]1992: 
3), “What does not yet exist cannot now be known.” 
Equally important, the first-order uncertainty implied by any particular innovation 
is “compounded by uncertainty about the second-order creative reactions of others” 
(Bronk 2011: 9). Instead of a world of stable and knowable parameters, economic 
agents are now faced with a dynamic world of constant change and novelty – a world 
that is indeterminate or uncertain. It is this ontological indeterminacy that “implies, as 
its epistemological counterpart, a lack of knowledge,” which Dequech (2011: 200) calls 
“fundamental uncertainty;” and it is this same indeterminacy that renders economic 
agents unable to make optimal choices and prevents markets from tending toward a 
predictable and efficient equilibrium. In such a world, there is no stable best practice, 
and no way of forecasting the future with any precision. People are left to adapt and spot 
emerging trends as best they can.
This link between innovation and radical uncertainty has crucial yet widely ignored 
implications for policymakers. Paradoxically, international trade and finance and mac-
ro-economic policy – areas where we see the highest incidence of radical product and 
policy innovation – have recently seen the greatest impetus towards EU-wide or glob-
ally homogenous regulatory standards. Perhaps the vertiginous degree of uncertainty 
and indeterminacy caused by rampant innovation triggers an anxious attempt to con-
struct certainty by agreeing to converge on an ex ante definition of best practice.9 But 
9 It is often argued that early convergence on common standards is essential to stabilize expec-
tations and encourage investment in innovative markets (DeLisle/Grissom/Högberg 2013). 
However, any such standardization (e.g., in derivative markets) improves market stability and 
visibility in the short run at the potential cost of widespread instability in the long term if the 
standards are later found wanting. 
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such policy closure is often premature. As we have seen, innovation inevitably implies 
changes to the parameters of life and calls into question earlier lessons from experience 
about the nature of best practice. As a result, policymakers would be well advised to ex-
ercise more caution about putting all their regulatory and policy eggs in one basket and 
demonstrate more willingness to use diverse models as a source of ongoing adaptation 
to novelty. 
Consider, for example, how little that passed less than a decade ago for received wisdom 
in the area of monetary policy or banking regulation in the EU has survived the global 
financial and euro area crisis intact. Huge uncertainties were generated by rampant 
financial product innovation prior to 2007 and by the virtually unprecedented policy 
experiment that was Economic and Monetary Union. Had euro area policymakers tied 
their hands more completely than they did to an ex ante definition of best practice 
standards of banking regulation and monetary policy, their ability to adapt to emerg-
ing challenges would likely have been even weaker than it has proven to be. Those in 
the euro area now intent on forcing through a single rulebook under the auspices of the 
EU’s Banking Union, or enforcing the increasingly rigid and harmonized set of rules 
contained in the EU’s Fiscal Compact, might want to consider how wrong the pre-
crisis shibboleths of banking regulation and monetary policy have turned out to be. 
Best practice is often abruptly overturned in a world of constant novelty in policy and 
market practice. Taking uncertainty more seriously ought to lessen the rush toward any 
single regulatory or policy framework.
4 Framing effects and the dangers of regulatory monocultures 
Uncertainty about the future yet to be created is only one aspect of the knowledge prob-
lems that concern us. Equally important is the partial nature of any single theoretical 
perspective or conceptual frame used to make sense of reality. Monocultures – involv-
ing the widespread use of one cognitive frame – are tolerated, indeed encouraged, be-
cause of a naïve empiricism that assumes an unproblematic interface between knowing 
agents and the external world of objects. In fact, though, people never have unmedi-
ated access to the “world-as-it-really-is.” Instead, data and evidence are the product, in 
part at least, of the necessarily limited theoretical frames actors have internalized. This 
means that when they only have access to a single theory or set of organizing concepts – 
that is, when they operate in a monoculture – their ability to test (and update) this same 
theory (to ensure it is indeed the “best”) is compromised. This is because the facts at 
their disposal are partly constituted by the very theory those facts are being used to test.
To doubt that we can access reality without prejudice or use it objectively to guide our in-
terpretations is not some postmodern fetish. Instead, it can be traced back to the insight 
of Kant, who argued that we never have unmediated access to the “world-as-it-really-is.” 
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The world we experience, Kant argued, is necessarily structured by certain a priori inter-
pretive principles and learned empirical concepts that our minds supply. If, for example, 
our minds did not supply a notion of time and causation as necessary conditions of 
experience, and did not project onto the world of experience a set of learned conceptual 
grids, we would not be able to make sense of that world. The implications of this Kantian 
insight are enormous: it implies that any order we see in the world is something we read 
into it rather than infer from it (Bronk 2009: 104f., 257; Tarnas 1991: 344f.).
The Romantic philosophers and poets that followed Kant insisted that all knowledge 
is dependent on the perspectives and languages we use rather than being a mirror-
like reflection of objective reality (Abrams 1953). To use Wordsworth’s famous phrase 
([1798]1998: 268), we “half-create” the world of experience: it is the “joint product of 
the objects impinging on our senses” and the framework of interpretations our minds 
supply (Bronk 2009: 258). Coleridge ([1835]1985: 596) made this point beautifully, by 
likening to a lantern the principles of selection we must supply if we are to see any 
meaningful order in the facts before us: “You must have a lantern in your hand to give 
light, otherwise all the materials in the world are useless, for you cannot find them, and 
if you could, you could not arrange them.”
It has now become generally accepted that experience is necessarily a product of inter-
pretation and that perception and analysis of the world is grounded in ways of seeing 
that are either biologically inherited or historically and culturally contingent.10 How-
ever, the far-reaching implications of this consensus are much less widely appreciated 
and well worth articulating. First, as Abrams (1953: 31) noted, Romantic (and later 
postmodern and constructivist) epistemology implies that facts (as their Latin deriva-
tion from facta implies) are “things made as much as things found, and made in part 
by the analogies through which we look at the world as through a lens.” In other words, 
facts are not some objective touchstone for assessing the truth-value of a theory or best 
practice; they are part-creations of theory and metaphor. 
More troubling still, as Wittgenstein ([1953]2001: 165–168) illustrated with his famous 
example of the ambiguous duck-rabbit drawing, we are not normally aware that we are 
interpreting what we see as a duck or as a rabbit; instead, we may actually see a duck or 
a rabbit. In other words, most of the relevant priors and conceptual grids that structure 
how we see the world and construct evidence are unconsciously applied, and the inter-
pretive nature of perception is not something of which we are normally aware. Further, 
10 Postmodern philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists usually replace Kant’s notion of 
certain necessary ways in which all human experience is structured with a focus on historically-
conditioned or power-determined mental priors (as in Foucault) or largely unconscious con-
ceptual frameworks ingrained by social environment or status (as in Bourdieu). In biology, 
there is a parallel debate about how far our cognition is hard-wired and how far it is learned 
thanks to the brain plasticity that allows social experience to influence the very structure of our 
brains. A full theory of monocultures (and their framing effects) would consider how far they 
are historically and culturally path dependent, and also their relationship with power.
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since any theoretical framework or conceptual grid has limitations as a way of parsing 
reality and making sense of it, reliance on any one such framework implies an inevitable 
bias or limitation in our vision and analysis. 
This gets to the heart of the epistemological problem with monocultures. We need theo-
ries and conceptual structures to make sense of the chaos around us, in the same way 
that we need a lantern to see in the dark. Yet when we only have access to one theoretical 
or conceptual structure – one source of light – then our field of vision is likely to be se-
verely limited and our analysis biased.11 It is for this reason that a monoculture – which 
involves the widespread internalization of one mental framework or model – is so dan-
gerous. Even when a shared mental model is apparently the best available, reliance on 
this single model or framework implies that we will keep stumbling on aspects of reality 
we earlier missed, simply because these aspects lie outside the area illuminated by the 
framework or model we used (Bronk 2010: 103). 
The behavioral consequences of relying on a single set of framing ideas or conceptual 
priors can be debilitating enough. Even more pernicious can be the self-reinforcing 
feedback loops between practices and the intellectual ideas or cultural priors that struc-
ture them. Indeed, in the philosophical tradition of Wittgenstein – who saw conceptual 
structures and languages as intimately bound up with practice (Grayling 1996: 97) – we 
argue that the normal practices of socio-economic agents and the conceptual structures 
framing their analysis or vision are mutually constituted. This is crucial to our argu-
ment against regulatory monocultures and over-reliance on best practice in modeling: 
we argue that, especially in highly technical areas of finance and business, enforcement 
of homogenous practice is internalized, over time, into widely shared operating and 
analytical routines that lead insidiously to a dangerous homogenization of analysis and 
thought. Our contention is that a generalized notion of best practice or insistence on a 
single global (or EU-wide) regulatory approach homogenizes how agents think about 
issues, construct data, and analyze problems as well as how they act. The result is not 
only high correlations in behavior but also widely shared cognitive blind spots that may 
reinforce and entrench the behavioral correlations in a dangerous feedback loop. 
This inability to separate analysis from embedded practice may help explain the striking 
resilience of neo-liberal ideas that intrigues Schmidt and Thatcher (2013). It certainly 
seems to explain why, in the run up to the 2007 crisis, key players in central banks, 
regulation, and financial markets nearly all missed early warning signs that, in retro-
spect, seem obvious. For example, there were undoubtedly some talented economists 
questioning the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models being used by 
11 So, for example, as Fligstein/Brundage/Schultz (2014: 14) argue in relation to the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) at the US Federal Reserve, sense-making “requires a theory of ‘how 
the world works’” in order that relevant actors can “decide which facts to collect” and how to 
interpret them. However, as they also show, the FOMC’s reliance in recent years on a particular 
model kept it “in the dark” in the sense that its members could not imagine how problems evi-
dent in the housing sector could possibly spill over into the rest of the economy.
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all the main central banks; yet the banks’ dominant forecasting practices were (and re-
main) structured by these models. Further, since these models assume rational expecta-
tions and the tendency for markets to be in equilibrium and, most extraordinarily of all, 
simply ignore the financial sector and the possibility of default (Backhouse 2010: 133; 
Goodhart/Tsomocos/Shubik 2013), it is not surprising that the central bankers relying 
on them mostly failed to spot problems emerging from the shadow banking system.12 
Similarly, some regulators understood the limitations of VaR models, but most key op-
erators in both regulation and the trading houses simply internalized the structuring 
assumptions implicit in the risk models they used to structure their daily activities.13 
Given homogenous daily routines and shared modes of practice, almost everyone con-
structed data or analyzed events in similar ways. As a result, they were not predisposed to 
notice developments that their shared conceptual frameworks had no place for (Bronk 
2011: 15). For example, leading investment bankers at the time were reported as saying 
that even the events of August 2007 – a full year before the Lehman Brothers collapse – 
measured in their models as 25 standard deviation events (Haldane 2009a: 2). In other 
words, what they were now being forced to acknowledge was happening was simply 
outside the range previously considered remotely plausible. Practice (and thereby anal-
ysis) had become homogenized according to what was then considered best practice in 
risk management (a tendency encouraged by the global Basel II regulatory regime), and 
consequently nearly all the key players were blindsided by unexpected developments.
Analytical monocultures may, of course, initially be the product of the superior rhetori-
cal power of certain ideas promoted by elite epistemic communities or the overwhelm-
ing political and market power of certain advocacy coalitions (Schmidt/Thatcher 2013: 
32f.). We argue, however, that analytical monocultures tend to become particularly en-
trenched (and impervious to criticism) when embedded in widely shared technocratic 
practices, models, and data collection methods shaped by these same ideational frame-
works. The global homogenization of business practices and regulatory models repre-
sents a key stage in the emergence of global groupthink because it serves as the basis of 
an epistemic feedback loop between ideas and the empirical data framed (or behavior 
structured) by the regulatory, modeling, and practical manifestations of these ideas.14
12 In the same vein, Fligstein/Brundage/Schultz (2014: 49f.) point out that, while there has been 
substantial emphasis in recent academic literature (e.g., Mackenzie 2008) on the extent to which 
economic models are performative – creating markets “in their own image”– the real impor-
tance of these models in recent central banking history has been to constrain the ability of 
economists to understand and influence markets. 
13 See Mugge (Schmidt/Thatcher 2013: 211) on “the use of bank-internal risk-models for regula-
tory purposes in Basel II.” The problem was not just that these models turned out to be mis-
leading, but that there was a disastrous “elision between the previously distinct perspectives and 
cognitive frames of regulator and regulated” (Bronk 2011: 15).
14 See Bronk (2013b: 345) on “performative” reflexivity (belief-behavior-belief feedback loops) 
and concomitant “epistemic” reflexivity (theory-data-theory feedback loops).
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Our theory of regulatory and analytical monocultures bears an initial resemblance to 
the theory of scientific paradigms in Kuhn (1996) and policy paradigms in Hall (1993). 
Kuhn (1996: 11, 24) argued that those engaged in “normal” science are strongly em-
bedded in paradigms that involve a commitment to sharing “the same rules and stan-
dards for scientific practice” – a sort of scientific monoculture. Crucially, the vision of 
researchers is restricted and focused on the questions their methods and conceptual 
frameworks are well suited to answer. Indeed, at times, normal science seems to be little 
more than an “attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box 
that the paradigm supplies” (Kuhn 1996: 52). The reason for this restriction of focus is 
clear: paradigms provide scientists with a cognitive map they could not do without and 
help them spot significant patterns in what might otherwise be mere empirical noise 
(Kuhn 1996: 109; Bronk 2009: 268).
While Kuhn was clear about the benefits of paradigms, he was equally explicit about 
the cognitive losses they imply: all too often, anomalies that are later obvious are ini-
tially resisted or explained away by theory mending; and novel discoveries emerge “only 
with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation” 
(Kuhn 1996: 64). As a result, anomalies tend to build up until the dominant paradigm 
faces a crisis that is resolved only by a sudden shift to a completely new paradigm. This 
new paradigm helps scientists resolve some of the most pressing anomalies (although 
crucially this may be at the cost of losing other insights). Moreover, the scientific revo-
lution involved in a switch to a novel paradigm does not entail simply a consciously 
new interpretation of the facts. Rather, it implies a “change in visual gestalt” – a change 
in unconscious priors – that actually causes scientists to see the world differently. In a 
clear reference to Wittgenstein, Kuhn (1996: 85, 111) wrote: “What were ducks in the 
scientist’s world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards.”
In one crucial respect, though, our theory differs from that of Kuhn. We argue that the 
pattern he posits – of cognitive lock-in caused by standardized practice, punctuated by 
occasional gestalt shifts – is more a pathology generated by certain states of policymak-
ing (or science) than a necessary or normal feature of socio-economic (or scientific) 
life. There is, in fact, a ready and reliable antidote to cognitive lock-in and the need for 
traumatic crisis shifts in practice and vision, and to the market instability these may 
cause. Political economies can, and should, be structured in such a way as to allow for 
the disruptive influence of alternative models and theories (Bronk 2013b: 348); for, 
as Feyerabend ([1975]2010: 20) puts it, there “exist facts which cannot be unearthed 
except with the help of alternatives to the theory” being tested. Unless agents learn to 
hover between different conceptual frameworks, they will remain unable to detect un-
conscious interpretive biases in their perception and analysis.15 This is the reason we 
15 See the discussion in Tett (2015: 42f., 46) on the importance of “flipping” perspectives and 
“insider-outsider” vision; and in Bronk (2009: 280, 282f.) on engineering fluidity in the charac-
terization of situations by “an organized exercise of imagination in switching between different 
cognitive spectacles” – by “disciplined eclecticism.” 
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argue for multinational regimes that allow for different regulatory (and associated ana-
lytical) regimes to coexist, while managing the negative side effects of that diversity and 
exploiting its learning potential.
5 The dangers of monocropping and high correlations of behavior
The argument for diversity of regulation developed so far in this paper is based on 
the dangers (in conditions of uncertainty) of the generalized epistemic lock-in implied 
when analysis is embedded in globally homogenous theoretical narratives, cultural 
frames, and “best practice” routines. But our case against institutional and regulatory 
monocultures is also supported by an older argument in favor of institutional diversity 
– one based on the biological (rather than cultural) analogy of “monocropping.”
In modern biology, genetic diversity is seen as key to the long-term survival of species 
facing constantly emerging threats. Since potentially helpful mutations are essentially 
random, the larger the gene pool of a species the higher the chances of an adaptation 
emerging that is well-suited to a novel environmental challenge (Taleb 2014: 65–70). 
Moreover, there is plenty of evidence that whole ecosystems, such as those found in 
the oceans, are more robust and resilient if they comprise a diversity of species. For 
example, data from global fisheries reveals that the degree of local marine biodiversity 
has been a major factor in determining how prone any particular fishery is to sudden 
collapse (Worm et al. 2008: 787; Haldane 2009b: 17). 
When Michael Hannan (1986: 85) sought to establish the contribution of organiza-
tional diversity to the robustness of institutional frameworks facing radical uncertainty, 
he did so by analogy with the well-established importance of genetic diversity to the re-
silience of crop yields, noting that: “The spread of single strains of crops implies a great 
reduction in genetic diversity, which may prove problematic if new kinds of pests arise 
to which the ‘miracle’ crops are vulnerable.” Hannan (1986: 85) argued that the suppres-
sion of organizational diversity may also leave social systems more vulnerable to novel 
threats, since: “A system with greater organizational diversity has a higher probability of 
having in hand some solution that is satisfactory under changed environmental condi-
tions.” Evans (2004: 34) made a similar point, arguing that “institutional monocrop-
ping” reduces the adaptive potential of the international system as a whole to cope with 
unexpected developments. 
The implications for our argument of this biological analogy are as clear as they are 
often ignored: whenever institutional settings and regulations are harmonized across 
national markets, the international (or, in the EU case, regional) system may lose some 
of its resilience in the face of unknown shocks because of a reduction in the diversity of 
its institutional “gene pool.” At the same time, regulatory monocropping results in a loss 
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of institutional “genetic material” that might otherwise play a vital role in producing 
helpful institutional mutations. 
Before we explore further how safeguarding the diversity of regulatory frameworks can 
help trigger such institutional innovations, it is useful to consider another analogous 
argument for the merits of diversification – this time from portfolio theory. The most 
basic protection against uncertainty in investment portfolios is provided by diversifica-
tion across different types of investments so as to avoid having all your proverbial eggs 
in one basket. Even if one stock or asset category is judged likely to produce the highest 
average returns, the chances of unwelcome volatility in the face of unforeseen shocks 
are much lower if the portfolio is diversified across a number of investments or asset 
types. Crucially, though, it has been understood at least since Markowitz (1952) that 
diversification only succeeds in reducing the variability of returns (and the danger of an 
investment wipeout in the face of unexpected shocks) if the investments across which 
managers diversify are weakly, or better still negatively, correlated with one another in 
performance terms. 
By analogy, portfolio theory has two implications for our argument. First, it suggests 
that the international system as a whole may be less prone to excessive economic and 
financial market volatility or instability when governed by a diversified set of regula-
tory frameworks – provided that these frameworks are sufficiently differentiated that 
failure in one is weakly correlated with failure in another. Since regulatory frameworks 
are not neutral settings but strongly constitutive of analysis and practice, and since we 
cannot know ex ante which regulatory framework will be most negatively challenged 
by unforeseen shocks, it makes sense at the global or regional level to have a diversified 
portfolio of differentiated regulatory frameworks.16 Second, the analogy with portfolio 
theory suggests that moves to harmonize national regulatory frameworks with each 
other, and thereby increase the co-variance of performance between them, may serve 
to increase the volatility of performance of the global system as a whole when it is hit 
by unexpected shocks. It is clear, for example, that the post-2007 crisis would have been 
even more acute had the monetary policies and banking regulation of the Canadian 
and Asian economies been fully aligned with those of the US and Europe. In actual fact, 
these economies weathered the storm relatively well, affording some stability to the 
global economy (Isgut 2014).
16 Another feature of portfolio theory that, by analogy, is relevant to the argument presented in 
this paper is that most of the gains from diversification can be achieved by having a relative-
ly modest number of weakly (or negatively) correlated investments. The protective effect of 
diversification increases very little beyond a certain threshold. This suggests that the system-
level benefits of regulatory and cognitive diversity may also accrue with a fairly low number of 
(weakly correlated) policy regimes. It is not necessary for every city or even every nation to have 
their own regulatory regimes.
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The harmonization of regulatory standards is, of course, often advocated as a way of 
removing barriers to trade and investment and creating a fully integrated market. Yet 
here, too, analogies from biology and agriculture suggest the need for caution by im-
proving our understanding of non-linear dynamics in complex and highly intercon-
nected systems. The study of disease transmission, for example, reveals how important 
it can be to limit the interconnections between different segments of a population. In a 
similar vein, the management of forest fires has shown the importance of firebreaks to 
slow the spread of fire from one part of a forest to another. A more modular system is 
very often a more robust system. 
May et al. (2008: 894) and Haldane (2009b) make these analogies between the study 
of epidemics (or forest fires) and financial contagion explicit: just as it makes sense to 
vaccinate “super-spreaders” of disease and exercise some control over the movement 
of peoples from areas with a high incidence of disease to areas still free from it, so 
they argue it makes sense to concentrate regulatory efforts on the most interconnected 
financial institutions and champion some compartmentalization or modularity in fi-
nancial markets. While too much compartmentalization may reduce the diversification 
available to each segment and undermine their ability to withstand shocks, too little 
modularity at system level can greatly increase the chances of destabilizing financial 
contagion. 
Such studies raise doubts, for example, as to whether EU policymakers are justified in 
prioritizing the perfection of a single “Capital Markets Union” over the preservation 
of local differences in regulation where they have hitherto proven useful.17 Perhaps it 
is no coincidence that the relatively homogenous and highly interconnected financial 
markets seen in the last two decades have proven less stable than their more compart-
mentalized Bretton Woods predecessors, and more susceptible to destabilizing financial 
contagion. 
6 The value of diverse “experiments in living” for successful adaptation 
In the prior section, the analogies with biology and portfolio theory strongly suggested 
that institutional and cognitive diversity plays a role in fostering resilience and a capac-
ity for adaption in international financial and economic systems. In this section, we 
examine how diversity of regulation and analytical method can actually contribute to 
solving novel problems and fostering innovation.
17 See Anderson/Brooke/Kustosiova (2015) for discussion of how increasing financial integration 
within the EU through a Capital Markets Union may “increase risks to financial stability” if 
there is capital flight in a crisis – especially where the cross-border holdings are in bank deposits 
or bonds rather than long-term equity stakes. 
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It is often noted that prediction markets involving many people with diverse capabilities 
are better at predicting uncertain outcomes than the best so-called “experts;” and Page 
(2007: xvi, 7f., 159f., and passim) argues that it is diversity in perspectives, interpreta-
tions, heuristics, and models – in short, diversity in the “cognitive toolboxes” used – that 
is crucial to the success of such “distributed problem-solving.” Even the single most 
successful approach to problem-solving rarely outperforms the aggregate of diverse and 
reasonably smart approaches, since each approach looks at the problem from a different 
angle and brings different conceptual grids to bear. Nor is it the sheer number of deci-
sion-makers that matters but rather their diversity. Crowds are not wise when they all 
copy a particular way of thinking from one another – when they fall prey, for example, 
to a monoculture discourse of best practice. The wisdom of crowds only pertains when 
they contain individuals who exercise their own judgment, rely on their own cognitive 
resources, and see things from their own local perspective.18
Our discussion of uncertainty helps explain why such diversity of perspective is more 
important to regulators and policymakers than they often realize. When innovation 
and novelty abound, and the future is therefore radically indeterminate, accumulated 
wisdom about previously stable regularities in how the world works (as reproduced in 
best practice models) tends to become obsolete. Instead, what matters is the ability to 
develop innovative responses to novelty and spot newly emerging patterns. Here diver-
sity is key. Imaginative thinking is typically the product of the repeated juxtaposition 
of alternative ways of thinking and acting, which can then trigger new mental connec-
tions and new insights. Similarly, the ability to scan for emerging trends and new de-
velopments is fostered by the flexible use of different perspectives – different cognitive 
spectacles (Bronk 2009: 2, 203). It is for this reason that Lane and Maxfield (1996: 223, 
228) argue that heterogeneity of agents is key to the “generative relationships” behind 
innovative thinking.
David Stark (2009: xvi, and passim) has extensively mapped ways in which entrepre-
neurial organizations successfully exploit the dissonance of diverse competing con-
ceptual and evaluative frameworks to generate new ideas and help “navigate through 
uncharted territory.” In his account, the dissonance created by contending frameworks 
can have three positive effects: it helps disrupt established interpretations and dominant 
ways of looking at problems; it increases the chances of novel discoveries through an 
innovative recombination of existing ideas; and it generates new ways of looking at the 
world. As Stark (2009: 16f.) puts it: “Organizations that keep multiple evaluative prin-
ciples in play … foster a generative friction that disrupts received categories of business 
as usual and makes possible an ongoing recombination of resources.” The result of such 
organized diversity is a “cognitive ecology in which the friction among competing prin-
ciples … generates new ways of recognizing opportunities” (Stark 2009: 16).
18 For a discussion about the dangers of information cascades when diversity and independence of 
thinking are absent, see Surowiecki (2004: 40–65). See also a related argument that the “wisdom 
of prices” in markets only holds when agents are cognitively diverse in Bronk (2013a: 101).
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As Stark (2009: 159f.) observes, the willingness to maintain a “generative redundancy” 
of different approaches represents an implicit acceptance of the need to sacrifice short-
run “allocative efficiency” to the requirement for “dynamic adaptability” in the face of 
radical uncertainty. This is crucial to our argument: given massive uncertainty about 
what will constitute best practice in future, a policy of concentrating solely on estab-
lished best practice sacrifices long run adaptability (or dynamic efficiency) on the altar 
of short-term static definitions of efficiency. The cult of best practice – and the related 
advice to maximize efficiency by harmonizing regulations on a single model – often 
involves psychological denial in the face of uncertainty. Instead, we need to engage con-
stantly with different perspectives (and the practices with which they are intertwined); 
only then can we challenge existing implicit frameworks of interpretation, and have a 
good chance of identifying new challenges and their possible solutions.
It is for this reason that we argue for multilateral institutions at the global or EU level that 
combine tolerance of diverse regulatory practices with deliberative capacity to learn from 
the multiple analytical perspectives implied. This is not some utopian dream. As Sabel 
and Zeitlin (2010: 4–6) argue, many aspects of EU policymaking, for example, already con-
stitute a form of governance they call “deliberative polyarchy” that – by using multipolar 
inputs from policymakers from diverse regulatory and analytical traditions – is “a machine 
for learning from diversity.” The challenge, though, is to ensure such multilateral delibera-
tive spaces do not become a wasting asset under the constant pressure for them to be used 
to develop new harmonized and unified forms of governance (Bronk/Jacoby 2013: 15).
The merits of diversity in thought and practice do not, of course, represent a novel dis-
covery. It is often forgotten that Mill grounded much of his defense of individual liberty 
on the need for diverse “experiments in living.” The need for diversity of opinion and 
for varied experiments in living is, he argued, a necessary corollary of the fallibility of 
mankind and our inability to recognize “all sides of the truth” (Mill [1859]1991: 63). 
Only cognitive diversity and varied experiments in living can guarantee social progress, 
and ensure that we neither become slaves to custom nor fall foul of the “tendency in the 
best beliefs and practices to degenerate into the mechanical” (Mill [1859]1991: 71–72).
Mill’s work is equally important to our argument for another reason, however. He al-
ways qualified his championing of liberty – the freedom to be different and engage 
in one’s own experiments in living – with the caveat that this liberty should pertain 
only so long as it does not cause injury to others. This reminds us that diversity (and 
the freedom to be different) must always be managed. Diversity of practice (and even 
sometimes diversity of opinion) may cause serious damage to others unless it is care-
fully managed. Indeed, diversity of practice and regulation can often lead to discord 
and stalemate rather than productive friction, unless a modus vivendi is devised to allow 
for the peaceful coexistence of diverse ways of thinking and acting. Moreover, even the 
productive aspects of dissonance can only be realized in institutional frameworks that 
allow for mutual engagement between – and learning from – diverse outlooks and ex-
periments in living. This is not something that is easy to arrange. 
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7 Conclusion: Institutional prerequisites for managing and exploiting 
policy diversity
Western democracies have long experience in attempting to manage policy diversity. 
After all, since the rise of the Westphalian state, national diversity has been the default 
condition for most regulatory domains. Arguments in favor of each nation living ac-
cording to its own organically evolved rhythm go back at least to Herder and German 
reactions to French Enlightenment universalism (Bronk 2009). Yet the impetus towards 
homogenizing integration according to best-practice templates designed on rational 
principles has remained strong. 
Our paper raises epistemic and system-stability objections to this homogenizing im-
pulse, centered principally on the implied dangers of highly correlated policy errors and 
shared analytical blind spots. These objections complement those made by Nicolaïdis 
(2013) on democratic legitimacy grounds (the need to respect diverse voter preferenc-
es) and those emanating from the Varieties of Capitalism literature, with its focus on 
the need to safeguard each nation’s distinct area of comparative institutional advantage 
(Hall/Soskice 2001). Nevertheless, a vast and influential literature continues to presume 
that diversity in national regulatory and policy frameworks undermines economic ef-
ficiency, limits market integration, and serves primarily to protect vested interests (e.g., 
Büthe/Mattli 2011); and these assumptions underpin much of the current enthusiasm 
for regulatory homogenization. 
This paper does not claim to provide a definitive mechanism for deciding when the 
system-stability and epistemic advantages of regulatory diversity that we identify will 
trump the well-known static efficiency gains that may flow from regulatory conver-
gence. Rather we argue that when policymakers are making difficult judgment calls 
about the desirable degree of regulatory diversity versus cross-border harmonization, 
they should be guided by three factors:
 – The degree to which they are facing widespread uncertainty resulting from dynamic 
product or policy innovation; 
 – The degree to which they are operating in highly technical areas, where analysis as 
well as practice is heavily constrained by the framing effect of specialist models or 
conceptual frameworks;
 – The degree to which there are robust institutional mechanisms in place that can ma-
nage, and thereby reduce the costs that would otherwise flow from, policy diversity.
Whenever uncertainty is prevalent in highly technocratic areas of policy, and whenever 
cross-border mechanisms exist that can manage the costs of diversity, the balance is 
more likely to be in favor of regulatory diversity among nation states. 
In this final section, we examine some broad principles that are central to the effective 
management of regulatory diversity, and we further explore how to make judgments 
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about the relative merits of policy diversity and homogeneity. In particular, we examine 
the institutional prerequisites for sustaining diversity and harnessing its benefits, while 
simultaneously managing its costs. These principles are explained with reference to the 
European Union (as the most notable institutional example of managed diversity at the 
multinational level).
For diversity to provide benefits, it must first be sustained – no easy trick in the “age 
of globalization” (Sassen 2013): institutions must allow different national regulatory 
regimes and associated analytical approaches to coexist in such a way that the diver-
sity does not represent a serious impediment to trade or market integration. The most 
widely used mechanism for achieving regulatory diversity and market integration is the 
mutual recognition regime, which allows products or services produced in one regu-
latory environment to be recognized as legal for sale in another jurisdiction.19 Such 
regimes have characterized the European Single Market since the 1980s and have been 
extended to US-EU agreements in certain sectors such as airline safety. 
Mutual recognition has helped to preserve regulatory diversity in many areas in the EU 
(Nicolaïdis 2007). However, it is far from being a panacea. Indeed, mutual recognition 
is often resisted, especially in the area of services, for fear that ensuing competition be-
tween regulatory regimes will lead to a race to the bottom or severe regulatory arbitrage 
where only a single lax model of regulation will ultimately survive. Such fears can be 
allayed to some extent by introducing subtle mechanisms that balance the principle 
of open competition between diverse regimes with an element of minimum (“equiva-
lent”) standards or “jurisdictional reciprocity.”20 These measures to manage, and indeed 
19 “Comply or explain” regimes are intermediate between mutual recognition and the full harmo-
nization of differences.
20 When discussing “regulatory arbitrage,” it is important to distinguish between (a) activities de-
signed to undermine the integrity of a country’s specific local regulations or policies by rebook-
ing business (whose end-users are still located in that country) through entities regulated by 
other jurisdictions with looser requirements; and (b) the normal tendency in competitive capi-
talism for a clustering of specialist activities in locations with institutional frameworks support-
ive of that activity. We view tendency (b) as generally benign: it leads to countries specializing in 
their areas of comparative institutional advantage and ensures they have distinctive cycles and 
exposures, thereby increasing the modularity and variety of the system as a whole. By contrast, 
there is clearly some need (as part of managing diversity) for multinational coordination to 
limit tendency (a), which (if left unchecked) undermines the ability of a country to imple-
ment distinctive policies, thereby reducing regulatory heterogeneity and system resilience. A 
good example of careful management of such deleterious regulatory arbitrage is the imposition 
of “jurisdictional reciprocity” for countercyclical capital buffers (CCBs) under Basel III (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2015; Reinhardt/Sowerbutts 2015). The aim here is not to 
harmonize the application of CCBs across countries, but to ensure that, if a country employs a 
certain rate, it will apply to all lending in that jurisdiction regardless of whether it is carried out 
by a domestic bank, local subsidiary, or branch of a foreign bank. Such jurisdictional reciprocity 
is a limited suspension of the principle of mutual recognition to ensure the integrity of local 
policy discretion.
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qualify, mutual recognition help prevent market abuses that might otherwise lead to 
market-enforced harmonization (including a race-to-the-bottom dynamic) that would 
itself threaten the stability and vitality of the system.
A core cognitive challenge to the principle of mutual recognition is that regulatory dif-
ferences are frequently seen as deviations from stylized best practice rather than as 
functional contributions to distinctive (often national) systems of production or to the 
long-term stability and dynamic efficiency of the larger system. Particularly at times of 
crisis there is an understandable tendency to converge on what is currently seen as best 
practice. So, for example, hopes of avoiding another euro area crisis are being pinned 
on the proposed banking and capital markets unions, which seek to unify European 
financial markets under a single rulebook, central supervision, and centralized coun-
terparties. Our argument suggests, though, that these moves may paradoxically run the 
risk of heightening (rather than reducing) the chances of systemic failure by increasing 
the likelihood of high correlations in regulatory failure.
Other conditions are also needed to ensure sustained regulatory diversity in the long 
run. In particular, the multinational mechanisms that police cross-border trade and 
investment (or indeed a monetary union) need to avoid the sort of power asymmetries 
that allow any one state to impose its regulatory practices on others. This is a very real 
issue in the euro area. While the Maastricht and Nice Treaties intentionally balanced 
the power of large and small member states (Fabbrini 2015), the post-2009 period has 
seen an increasing power imbalance favoring Germany. Policy, regulatory and indeed 
cognitive diversity has been damaged by the entrenching of what we call the “German 
consensus” through the EU’s Fiscal Compact and the conditionality involved in ESM 
bailouts (Bronk/Jacoby 2013). In the areas of fiscal policy and financial market regu-
lation, it is much harder now to recognize within the euro area even the outlines of 
what Sabel and Zeitlin call “deliberative polyarchy.” For better or worse, in large areas of 
policy, the writ of Germany now dominates.
A further requirement for sustaining analytical and policy diversity is to ensure the 
survival of “minority traditions” – that is, institutional practices that are currently less 
fashionable – within unitary authorities at EU or global level. Without sophisticated 
governance techniques to help keep diversity alive and multiple models viable (Jacoby 
2006), homogenization of analysis and practice may become inevitable. The ECB is an 
example of a multinational institution where the diversity of intellectual and monetary 
policy traditions may be a wasting asset. Starting with personnel from a variety of na-
tional traditions, it is now evolving an increasingly monolithic and sui generis approach 
to monetary policy and banking regulation in the wake of the eurocrisis (Majone 2014).
Even if analytical and policy diversity can be sustainably secured, institutions are also 
required to harness the cognitive benefits of that diversity by providing fora where dif-
ferent countries can learn from experiments elsewhere. Such fora must challenge poli-
cymakers with the disruptive influence of alternative intellectual and regulatory frame-
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works into both avoiding epistemic lock-in and developing novel permutations. This is 
a demanding task. The experimental “deliberative polyarchy” within the EU analyzed by 
Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) explicitly leverages such differences. Problems remain, howev-
er: for one, there is a difference between the desirable deployment of dissonant perspec-
tives as a productive irritant that may generate novel pearls of wisdom – what Puetter 
(2014) calls “deliberative intergovernmentalism” – and the more mundane benchmark-
ing of good practice as a method of choosing between policy options. Moreover, it is not 
clear in Sabel and Zeitlin’s account what process replenishes the institutional diversity 
from which “good” solutions are winnowed and shared. 
If multinational institutions are to sustain diversity and harness it for the foregoing 
purposes, they must also mitigate the well-known potential costs of diversity. Some of 
the disadvantages of policy diversity can be greatly reduced by encouraging coordina-
tion (without excessive harmonization) and managing the negative externalities of indi-
vidual country behavior – particularly by preventing some countries free riding on the 
prudence of others. This can be achieved through a combination of shared minimum 
standards (or basic norms) and joint institutions (such as the European Commission 
and Council) that are able to negotiate mutually acceptable outcomes and compensa-
tory side-payments for harm caused by individual country behavior, without markedly 
infringing on the degree of policy diversity.
It would, of course, be disingenuous to claim that all the costs of policy diversity can 
be avoided by careful coordination. Some costs are an inevitable consequence of policy 
diversity. Three classes of such costs stand out: first, cases where there are particularly 
strong spillover effects of policy experiments in one country on another; second, cases 
where policy diversity itself diminishes the performance of the system as a whole in the 
long run – for example, due to high transaction costs generated by regulatory diver-
sity for cross-border trade; and third, instances where diversity taxes individual polities 
with poor regulatory processes that lead to poor performance over multiple business 
cycles that could be ameliorated by convergence. There remains, therefore, a need for 
institutional capacity to make difficult judgments about where the inevitable costs of 
regulatory diversity outweigh the benefits and how to distinguish “permanently failing 
organizations” (Meyer/Zucker 1989, passim) from those that are simply temporarily less 
successful. 
When making such policy judgments, the costs of diversity must always be weighed 
against the potential epistemic and market costs of policy monocultures highlighted 
in this paper – that is, against the dangers of shared analytical blind spots and market 
instability caused by highly correlated policy errors. Our analysis suggests that these 
cognitive and systemic costs of policy and regulatory harmonization are likely to be 
much higher in conditions of uncertainty resulting from widespread innovation – argu-
ably the new normal in many areas of finance and business. The analogy with portfolio 
theory also suggests that the costs of harmonization will rise steeply when policy and 
epistemic diversity falls below a certain threshold (and tends towards complete harmo-
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nization), whereas partial regulatory convergence may incur few costs provided that 
sufficient residual policy diversity remains at global or system level. Most of the gains 
from portfolio diversification (in terms of reduced volatility) come when moving away 
from very concentrated asset holdings – and further gains diminish quite quickly as the 
number of stocks rises. Similarly, most of the gains from regulatory diversification in 
terms of the stability of the global financial and economic system may also be achieved 
with moderate regulatory diversification. In other words, there is no need for every 
small country to retain its own regulatory regime, but the global system is much stron-
ger if a moderate number of weakly or negatively correlated regimes remain.
The benefits of cognitive diversity are similarly non-linear: while analytical monocul-
tures lead (as we have seen) to severe cognitive myopia, and moderate cognitive diversi-
ty supports greater levels of insight and adaptability, a cacophony of countless disparate 
ways of thinking may lead merely to confusion and serious coordination difficulties. 
Ours is not an argument for maximum regulatory and analytical diversity but for suf-
ficient diversity to help avoid systemic crises and widespread epistemic lock-in.
Finally, our intervention maintains that analytical monocultures rooted in policy doc-
trines of global best practice are particularly dangerous in technocratic areas of multilat-
eral governance and global business, where thought and analysis are highly structured 
by the language and mechanics of specialist practice and therefore beyond the reach of 
normal political debate. Even more than at the national level, supranational regulation 
tends to be delegated to specialist technocracies largely isolated from other facets of 
(mostly national) policymaking (Mugge 2013). If such technocracies are not to fall prey 
to monoculture thinking, they must, we argue, remain fully exposed to epistemological 
(as well as normative) challenge from dispersed and diverse market and political actors. 
Some delegation to technical experts able to exercise judgment is, of course, necessary 
in complex areas of policy; but the frequent desire to render the judgment makers inde-
pendent of voter preferences (and protect them from political pressure) can engender 
an unhealthy insulation from the wisdom of crowds. Similarly, when technocracies such 
as the ECB try to manage markets by engineering certain outcomes that deliberately in-
terfere with the price mechanism (such as homogenous collateral in repo markets (Ga-
bor/Ban 2015) or stable long term rates engineered via quantitative easing), they may 
cut themselves off from the wisdom Hayek ascribed to the price mechanism so long as 
it reflects genuinely decentralized cognition (Bronk 2013a). When designing regulatory 
institutions and other policy instruments, everything must be done to ensure that poli-
cymakers remain open to epistemic challenge, decentralized information, and multiple 
perspectives. Only then will they have a good chance of avoiding the correlated errors 
and shared blind spots that frequently threaten the health and stability of both markets 
and societies when they fall prey to homogenous narratives of best practice. 
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